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Abstract
In 2008, Congress enacted amendments to the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA ") that expanded the ADA s definition of "disability, "requiring employers to provide
reasonable accommodations to workers with temporary impairments. This Article argues
that the expansion of the protections of the ADA effectively expanded the protections of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act ("PDA'), too. As the Supreme Court recently reinforced in
Young v. United Parcel Service, the PDA generally requires employers to treat pregnant
workers "the same" as non-pregnant workers who are similar in their ability or inability to
work. Therefore, to the extent that pregnancy-related impairments mirror impairments that
are accommodated under the expanded ADA, pregnant workers, too, should be entitled to
reasonable accommodations.
Although some scholars and courts have suggested that ADA-covered employees
cannot be proper comparators for PDA plaintiffs, I make the case that these workers can,
and should, be compared First, I argue that PDA precedent requiring employers to treat
pregnant workers the same as other impaired workers, as well as the legislative history
of the PDA, compel this comparison. Second, I draw on two theoretical approaches
intersectionality theory and "disruption" theoy to demonstrate that denying ADA
comparators to PDA plaintiffs ignores the unique intersectional nature ofpregnancy, and
would invite stereotyping, segregation, and discrimination. In conclusion, I note that the
Supreme Court signaled in Young that courts should take a more expansive view of the
types of evidence that can support a PDA claim, opening the door to a broader approach
to the comparator question.
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Amy Berman Jackson, United States District Court for the District of
Columbia; J.D., Yale Law School, 2013. I am grateful to Professor Vicki Schultz for her invaluable guidance
and insights, as well as to Professor Anne Alstott, Emily Read, Andrew Tutt, Elizabeth Wilkins, Clare Ryan,
Zach Strassburger, Micah Ratner, Molly Weston, and the members of the Family, State, and Market II seminar
for their feedback and suggestions. Many thanks also to the editors of the Columbia Journal of Gender and Law.
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INTRODUCTION
In the last two decades, the United States has seen an explosion in pregnancy
discrimination claims. The number of pregnancy-related charges filed with the EEOC
nearly doubled from 1992 to 2010,1 even though the number of antidiscrimination cases
as a whole has declined every year since 1998.2 Congress enacted the PDA in 1978 to
clarify that pregnancy discrimination constituted prohibited discrimination on the basis of
sex under Title VII.3 Yet the prevailing interpretation of the PDA has made it difficult for
plaintiffs to establish a successful claim. Moreover, many pregnant workers could work
later into their pregnancies if their employers made even simple accommodations-but
these accommodations are not currently required by law.5
Pregnant employees have lost theirjobs for reasons directly related to their pregnancies.
For example, pregnant workers have been fired for needing extra bathroom breaks 6 or
1 Specifically, pregnancy discrimination charges increased from 3,385 in FY 1992 to 6,119 in FY2010. U.S.
EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N (EEOC), PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION CHARGES: EEOC & FEPAs COMBINED:
FY 1992-FY 1996; EEOC, PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION CHARGES: EEOC & FEPAs COMBINED: FY 1997-FY 2011.
The U.K. is seeing a similar trend. Myriain Francois-Cerrah, Workplace Pregnancy Discrimination on Rise,
AL JAZEERA (Mar. 15, 2013), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/03/201331454320759501.html
[http://perma.cc/32KH-MXGC].
2 SOPHIA THOMAS CALVERT, CTR. FOR WORKLIFE LAW, FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES DISCRIMINATION: LITIGATION
UPDATE 2010 9 (2010), http://www.worklifelaw.org/pubs/FRDupdate.pdf [http://perma.cc/82X5-PZHL]
[hereinafter CENTER FOR WoRKLIFE LAW REPORT].
3 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).
4 See Joanna L. Grossman & Gillian L. Thomas, Making Pregnancy Work: Overcoming the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act s Capacity-BasedModel, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 15, 35 (2009).
5 See NOREEN FARRELL ET AL., EQUAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES, EXPECTING A BABY, NOT A LAY-OFF: WHY FEDERAL
LAW SHOULD REQUIRE THE REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION OF PREGNANT WORKERS 3 (2012), http://www.equalrights.
org/wp-content/uplo ads/2013/02/Expecting-A-B aby-Not-A-L ay- Off-Why-Federal-L aw- Should-Require-
the-Reasonable-Accommodation-of-Pregnant-Workers.pdf [http://penna.cc/X4RX-RAVF] [hereinafter ERA
REPORT] ("[T]he data suggests that pregnant workers are seeking accommodations that are minor and easily
met by employers after good faith negotiations.").
6 EMILY MARTINET AL., NAT'L WOMEN'S LAW CTR. & A BETTER BALANCE, IT SHOULDN'T BE A HEAVY LIFT: FAIR
TREATMENT FOR PREGNANT WORKERS 4 (2013), http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/pregnant workers.pdf
[http://penna.cc/8G9M-YHS S] [hereinafter NWLC REPORT]; Dina Bakst, Pregnant, andPushedOutofaJob,N.Y
TIMES (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/31/opinion/pregnant-and-pushed-out-of-a-job.html
[http://permna.cc/8HHR-9MXD].
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to drink water on the job,7 and have been denied light duty assignments despite doctor-
ordered heavy-lifting restrictions.8 The difficulties facing pregnant women 9 on the job have
increasingly gained the attention of the EEOC, 10 the media,11 legal scholars, 12 advocacy
organizations,13 and, most recently, the Supreme Court of the United States. 14
7 Wiseman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 08-1244-EFM, 2009 WL 1617669, at *1 (D. Kan. June 9, 2009).
8 Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2013) (upholding the refusal to accommodate a
pregnant worker with a doctor-ordered heavy lifting restriction), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
9 This is not to ignore the fact that transgender men and gender non-conforming people may also
become pregnant. See, e.g., Guy Trebay, He Pregnant. You're Speechless, N.Y TIMES (June 22, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/22/fashion/22pregnant.html [http://perma.cc/MX4U-SUB7] (telling the
story of Thomas Beatie, a transgender man who became pregnant). I attempt to acknowledge this possibility by
using the tenns "pregnant worker" and "pregnant employee" as much as possible, but I do also refer to pregnant
"women" throughout this Article. I want to recognize in this "guilty footnote" that gender identity is distinct
from reproductive capacity. Cf Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 581 (1990) [hereinafter Harris, Race and Essentialism] (criticizing the work of Catherine MacKinnon and
noting that "issues of race do not even appear in guilty footnotes").
10 E.g., EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED ISSUES (June 25, 2015),
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/pregnancyguidance.cfm#amer[http://perna.cc/X6FC-ZP5E] [hereinafter
2015 EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE]; EEOC, STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT PLAN FY 2013-2016 9-10 (2012),
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/sep.pdf [http://penna.cc/2KRC-LRN3] [hereinafter EEOC STRATEGIC
ENFORCEMENT PLAN] (identifying "accommodating pregnancy-related limitations under the Americans
with Disabilities Amendments Act (ADAAA) and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA)" as a priority
"[e]merging and [d]eveloping [i]ssue[]" for the EEOC).
11 E.g., Brigid Schulte, Pregnant Women Fight to Keep Jobs via 'Reasonable Accommodations,' WASH.
POST (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/pregnant-women-fight-to-keep-
jobs-via-reasonable-accommodations/2014/08/04/9eb 13654-1408-11 e4-8936-26932bcfd6edstory.html
[http://perma.cc/8Q79-YEQV]; Chris Roberts, Pregnancy Discrimination Case at Lucasfilm Continues,
NBC BAY AREA (Mar. 28, 2013), http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/Pregnancy-Discrimination-Case-at-
Lucasfilm-Continues-200462131.html [http://perna.cc/DgNF-DAU5]; Eric Brown, Oprah Hit With Lawsuit
Over Pregnancy Discrimination, INT'L. BUS. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2013), http://www.ibtimes.com/oprah-hit-lawsuit-
over-pregnancy-discrimination-1057584 [http://perna.cc/56GU-DJV7].
12 E.g., Jeanette Cox,Pregnancyas "Disability" and the AmendedAmericans with DisabilitiesAct, 53 B.C.
L. REv. 443 (2012); Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 961 (2013); Joan C. Williams et al.,
A Sip of Cool Water: Pregnancy Accommodation After the ADA Amendments Act, 32 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
97 (2013).
13 E.g., CENTER FOR WoRKLIFE LAW REPORT, supra note 2; ERA REPORT, supra note 5.
14 Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
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On March 25, 2015, the Supreme Court clarified the meaning of the PDA in Young
v. United Parcel Service,15 handing pregnant workers both a victory and a challenge.
Young was a victory for pregnant employees because it announced an interpretation of the
PDA that has the potential to reinvigorate the Act's protections. It presented a challenge,
however, because it reinforced the primacy of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework as the method for proving most pregnancy discrimination claims. 16 Historically,
pregnancy discrimination plaintiffs have found it difficult to prove their cases under
McDonnell Douglas because success through that framework almost always depends
on the ability to identify a "comparator"-a similarly situated non-pregnant worker who
was treated better.17 Workers seeking accommodations for the temporary impairments
that can arise out of pregnancy have been hard-pressed to find comparators because the
law has not required employers to provide accommodations to workers with temporary,
non-pregnancy-related impairments, either, especially when the source of the impairment
is unrelated to the worker's job. Yet in the wake of Young, it appears that the availability of
adequate comparators for PDA plaintiffs is more important than ever before.
This Article argues that a new day has dawned for pregnancy discrimination claims
thanks to the 2008 Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act ("ADAAA").18 The
ADAAA expanded the definition of "disability" under the ADA to include temporary
impairments similar to the ones that sometimes accompany pregnancy. 19 Notably, pregnancy
itself did not gain coverage under the employment provisions of the ADA through the
ADAAA, 2° and it is not considered a disability by the courts or the EEOC.21 But, as this
15 Id.
16 See id. at 1344; see also infra Part I.B for further discussion and explanation of the McDonnell Douglas
framework.
17 See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728 (2011).
18 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a)-(b), 122 Stat. 3553 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117).
19 See, e.g., Summers v. Altarum Inst., Corp., 740 F.3d 325, 327 (4th Cir. 2014) (leg injuries); Cohen v.
CHLN, Inc., No. 10-00514, 2011 WL 2713737, at *3, *11 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 2011) (back injury); Fleck v.
WILMAC Corp., No. 10-05562, 2011 WL 1899198, at *1, *6 (E.D. Pa. May 19, 2011) (ankle injury).
20 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2012).
21 See Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 553 (7th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases holding that
"absent unusual circumstances, [pregnancy] is not a physical impairment"). In addition, EEOC enforcement
guidance issued in 2015 states that "pregnancy itself is not an impairment within the meaning of the ADA, and
thus is never on its own a disability," although "some pregnant workers may have impairments related to their
pregnancies that qualify as disabilities under the ADA, as amended." 2015 EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE,
30.1 257
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW
Article shows, the ADA's expanded definition of "disability" provides PDA plaintiffs with
a new pool of potential comparators: temporarily impaired workers receiving reasonable
accommodations under the ADA. In other words, thanks to the ADA, PDA plaintiffs
should be more likely to receive workplace accommodations because they can now point
to workers with temporary impairments who receive accommodations under the ADA as
comparators. 22 Indeed, the Supreme Court itself acknowledged this possibility in Young,
although the Court did not consider it further because the facts of that case predated
the ADAAA.23
Although the ADAAA was enacted in 2008, it does not appear that any court has
permitted a PDA plaintiff to use an ADA-covered colleague as a comparator to date.24
In addition, some courts and theorists have questioned whether ADA-covered employees
can properly serve as comparators for PDA plaintiffs at all.25 Essentially, their argument
goes, workers who receive accommodations mandated by a federal statute are inherently
dissimilar from, and therefore not comparable to, workers who do not. The most egregious
example of this reasoning was found in the Fourth Circuit's opinion in the Young
case-now vacated by the Supreme Court-which did not consider the impact of the
ADAAA. 26 Still, it is not yet clearly established that temporarily disabled workers covered
by the ADA may serve as comparators for PDA plaintiffs.
This Article draws on existing case law, including Young, legislative history, and
employment discrimination law theories to make the case in favor of the use of ADA
comparators in PDA cases. No scholar has addressed this question in depth or considered
it in the context of the Supreme Court's opinion in Young.27 Thus, this Article is the first
to closely examine the availability of ADA-covered employees as comparators for PDA
plaintiffs under current law.
supra note 10, at II.A.
22 Williams et al. have termed this approach the ."de facto' comparator theory." See Williams et al., supra
note 12, at 120-22.
23 See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1348 (2015).
24 See Williams et al., supra note 12, at 123.
25 See Serednyj, 656 F.3d at 548; Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, UnprotectedSex: The Pregnancy
Discrimination Act at 35, 21 DuKE J. OF GENDER L. & POL'Y 67, 95 (2013); Cox, supra note 12, at 469-71.
26 See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437, 448-49 (4th Cir. 2013).
27 See, e.g., Cox, supra note 12; Brake & Grossman, supra note 25; Widiss, supra note 12; Williams et al.,
supra note 12.
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Part I provides the social and legal context for the claim that the ADAAA has effectively
expanded the PDA by enlarging the pool of available comparators. It begins by detailing
the serious problems pregnant workers face and the ways employment discrimination law
has failed them. Then, I explore the PDA, the Young opinion, the amended ADA, and the
comparator issue in greater depth.
Part II shows that the use of ADA comparators in PDA cases finds support in the weight
of PDA precedent, as well as the legislative history of the PDA. Indeed, as I will discuss, to
prohibit the use of ADA comparators would defy the logic of the most prominent pre-Young
PDA cases, which rest on the principle that the PDA does not require employers to treat
impaired pregnant workers any differently than similarly-impaired non-pregnant workers.
But if the ADAAA now requires employers to accommodate many more impaired non-
pregnant workers, failing to accommodate similarly impaired pregnant workers would
constitute treating them worse than their colleagues.
Part III will draw on theoretical approaches that highlight the dangers of oversimplifying
and reinforcing identity differences. First, I discuss intersectionality theory,28 and I argue
that Title VII has failed pregnant workers in part because courts have not recognized that
pregnancy discrimination is the product of the unique interaction between stereotypes
about women, stereotypes about pregnancy, and the reality that pregnancy can sometimes
cause impairments. For this reason, comparisons between pregnant and temporarily
disabled workers are not only appropriate, but also necessary to fully address pregnancy
discrimination.
Second, I engage with an emerging theoretical approach that views discrimination
as part of a process of creating "difference" that operates by singling out certain
groups for differential treatment. Scholars like Noah Zatz, Richard Thompson Ford,
and especially Vicki Schultz argue that antidiscrimination law should target workplace
practices that create these differences because creating difference leads to segregation
and stereotyping. This new approach suggests that treating pregnant workers differently
than other workers with similar impairments will undermine the purposes of the PDA
28 Intersectionality is a concept first introduced by critical race theorist Kimberlk Crenshaw. See Kimberlk
Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection ofRace and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique ofAntidiscrimination
Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 [hereinafter Crenshaw,
Demarginalizing the Intersection]. Since then, many scholars have also embraced this approach. See, e.g., Beth
Ribet, Emergent Disability and the Limits of Equality: A Critical Reading of the UN Convention on the Rights
ofPersons with Disabilities, 14 YALE Hum. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 155, 185 (2011).
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by allowing employers and coworkers to marginalize pregnant women, thus promoting
segregation, stereotyping, and discrimination.
I. Pregnancy, Disability, and Work
A. Pregnancy Discrimination Claims on the Rise
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 established two important principles: first,
that pregnancy discrimination constitutes discrimination "because of sex" in violation
of Title VII; 29 and, second, that employers must generally treat pregnant workers "the
same" as similarly impaired non-pregnant workers.30 Despite the enactment of the
PDA more than three decades ago, however, the number of pregnancy discrimination
charges filed with the EEOC has nearly doubled in the past twenty years.31 The cause
of this uptick in filings is not entirely clear, but likely factors include the increased
number of working mothers, the greater attention to pregnancy discrimination and
work-life issues in the media, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which made increased
damages and jury trials available to discrimination plaintiffs.3 2 The EEOC has identified
pregnancy discrimination as an enforcement priority,33 and it issued new pregnancy
discrimination guidance on June 25, 2015. 3"
29 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).
30 See id.; see also Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1341 (2015).
31 See supra note 1.
32 CENTER FOR WORKLIFE LAW REPORT, supra note 2, at 9. This report focuses not only on pregnancy
discrimination, but also on the broader category of "family responsibilities discrimination." Still, perhaps
because of the large increase in pregnancy discrimination claims documented above, 67% of the cases reviewed
in this study related to pregnancy and maternity leave. See supra note 2, at 10.
33 EEOC STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT PLAN, supra note 10. The EEOC also recently won several large
settlements on behalf of PDA plaintiffs. See, e.g., Press Release, EEOC, Merry Maids Franchise to Pay $40,000
to Resolve EEOC Pregnancy Discrimination Suit (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/
release/9-16-14.cfm [http://perma.cc/2SRU-QBJW]; Press Release, EEOC, Landau Uniforms Settles EEOC
Pregnancy Discrimination Suit for $80,000 (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/4-8-
13a.cfm [http://perna.cc/6DBJ-R4KH].
34 See Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Issues Updated Pregnancy Discrimination Guidance (June 25, 2015),
http ://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/6-25-15.cfm [http ://penna.cc/TZ9M-AN3E]. The EEOC's 2015
pregnancy discrimination guidance updated its 2014 pregnancy discrimination guidance in light of the Supreme
Court's opinion in Young. Id.
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Many pregnant workers will experience at least some symptoms that could interfere
with theirjob performance. For instance, even women with healthy pregnancies may suffer
from morning sickness, or have difficulty lifting, pulling, climbing, pushing, standing, or
sitting for long periods of time.3" Workplace conflicts can arise when employees request
simple accommodations to ease these discomforts,36 and the PDA does not require
employers to accommodate pregnant workers.37
Court opinions and news reports document the stories of numerous workers who
would have been able to continue working with even minimal accommodations for their
pregnancy-related impairments. For example, in 2007, Heather Wiseman was fired from
her position as a sales floor associate at a Kansas Wal-Mart for "insubordination" because
she refused to abide by a policy that prohibited non-cashier employees from carrying water
bottles at work.38 Ms. Wiseman's doctor had recommended that she carry a water bottle
because she was experiencing urinary and bladder problems associated with her pregnancy
that required her to drink water regularly, but Wal-Mart was unyielding.39 Similarly, in
1999, Maria Flores left her job as a cashier at a Philadelphia Home Depot because her
employer refused to make simple accommodations for her pregnancy-related impairments . 40
Ms. Flores had produced three separate notes from her doctor explaining that she was
restricted from some of her job requirements, which included standing for up to six hours
without a break.41 But her employer refused to accommodate her or to transfer her to a less
strenuous position.42
35 See Deborah A. Calloway, Accommodating Pregnancy in the Workplace, 25 STETSON L. REv. 1, 4-5
(1995) (describing the physical changes and limitations women may experience during pregnancy); see also
Williams et al., supra note 12, at 142-48 (appendix entitled "Some Pregnancy Conditions That Commonly
Give Rise to the Need for Workplace Accommodations").
36 See ERA REPORT, supra note 5, at 3 ("[T]he data suggests that pregnant workers are seeking
accommodations that are minor and easily met by employers after good faith negotiations.").
37 See Grossman & Thomas, supra note 4, at 33-34 (explaining that the PDA does not create affirmative
rights for pregnant workers).
38 Wiseman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 08-1244-EFM, 2009 WL 1617669, at * 1 (D. Kan. June 9, 2009).
39 Id.
40 Flores v. Home Depot, Inc., No. CIVA. 01-6908, 2003 WL 1793388, at * 1 (E.D. Pa., Apr. 3, 2003).
41 Id.
42 Id. Notably, the court denied the employer's motion for summary judgment on Ms. Flores' Title VII
claims because of evidence that the employer had provided accommodations for pregnant employees who
were white, but not for Ms. Flores, who was Hispanic. Id. at *10-12. It is possible that the combination of
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Ms. Wiseman and Ms. Flores are not alone. In recent years, courts have upheld the actions
of employers that fired or failed to accommodate pregnant workers who requested extra
bathroom breaks, 43 who needed schedule changes because of severe morning sickness, 44 and
who presented doctor-ordered heavy-lifting restrictions. 4 And as some of these examples
reflect, these failures to accommodate disproportionately plague women in low-income, blue
collar, and traditionally male-dominated occupations. 46 Although pregnancy discrimination
affects workers in all types of jobs, 47 lower-income workers generally have less flexibility
and control over their workdays, making it more difficult to balance pregnancy limitations
with work.48
The increasing centrality of women as wage earners further magnifies these problems.
In 1960, only 20% of mothers worked; 49 today, 70.1% of mothers are either working or
looking for work. ° Moreover, working mothers are now the primary earners in 40% of
families with children under age eighteen." Of this group, 37% are married mothers who
Ms. Flores' pregnancy and her national origin made her particularly vulnerable to discrimination. See infra
Part III.A for a discussion of the intersectional nature of pregnancy discrimination claims.
43 NWLC REPORT, supra note 6, at 4; Bakst, supra note 6. See also Cox, supra note 12, at 452-53 (listing
examples).
44 E.g., Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994).
45 Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437, 437 (4th Cir. 2013); see also ERA REPORT, supra note
5, at 4.
46 Grossman & Thomas, Making Pregnancy Work, supra note 4, at 22 (noting that college-educated women
are more likely to work longer into their pregnancies); Laura Schlichtmann, Accommodation of Pregnancy-
Related Disabilities on the Job, 15 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 335, 338 (1994) ("[W]omen in more physically
demanding and lower-wage occupations - disproportionately women of color - are especially likely to need
on-the-job accommodation ... during pregnancy.").
47 See, e.g., Picard v. Louisiana, No. 10-868-JJB, 2013 WL 1087620, at *7 (M.D. La. Mar. 14, 2013)
(pregnancy discrimination action brought against State of Louisiana by a former Assistant Attorney General).
48 ERA REPORT, supra note 5, at 22-23. Studies show that flexible scheduling is available to two-thirds of
workers earning more than $71,000 per year, but to less than one-third of workers earning less than $28,000 per
year. In addition, one-third of lower-income workers cannot choose the timing of their breaks and nearly 60%
cannot decide when to arrive at work or leave. Id.
49 CENTER FOR WORKLIFE LAW REPORT, supra note 2, at 4.
50 Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Characteristics of Families-2014 (Apr. 23,
2015), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/fnamee.nr0.htm [http://perma.cc/3GA8-RKTS].
51 WENDY WANG, KIm PARKER & PAUL TAYLOR, BREADWINNER MOMS 1 (May 29, 2013), http://www.
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earn more than their spouses, and 63% are single mothers with an average income of
$20,000 a year.12 Thus, when pregnant workers are forced to leave their jobs, the workers
and the families they support suffer the consequences.
B. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act: Clarifying Title VII
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 clarified that pregnancy discrimination was
discrimination "because of sex" in violation of Title VII. 3 Congress enacted the statute for
the express purpose of repudiating the Supreme Court's decision in General Electric Co.
v. Gilbert.4 In that case, the Court held that General Electric ("GE") had not discriminated
on the basis of sex by excluding pregnancy from its disability insurance plan.5 Justice
Brennan and Justice Stevens authored vigorous dissents, arguing that GE's policy violated
Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination,56 and the PDA codified Congress' agreement
with the dissenting justices.
The PDA added two new clauses to the "definitions" section of Title VII. The
first clause states: "The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but
are not limited to, because or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions .... -5' This has been unambiguously understood to mean that discrimination
on the basis of pregnancy constitutes prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex
under Title VII. Therefore, employers may not lawfully discriminate against pregnant
pewsocialtrends.org/2013/05/29/breadwinner-moms/ [http ://penna.cc/K7J8-CE8T].
52 Id. at I n.2. These single mothers are also more likely to be black or Hispanic, and younger than married
mothers. Id. at 1.
53 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).
54 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 144-45 (1976). Both the Senate and House Reports on the PDA
cited the dissenting opinions of Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens as expressing the correct interpretation of
Title VII. See S. REP. No. 54-748, at 39-40 (1980); H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 2 (1978) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE PDA].
55 Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 144-45.
56 Id. at 146 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 160 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57 Both the House and Senate Reports cite the dissenting opinions in Gilbert. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE PDA, supra note 54.
58 § 2000e(k).
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workers in hiring, firing, pay, promotion, assignments, or any other term or condition
of employment.59
The second clause of the PDA provides: "[W]omen affected by pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related
purposes . . .as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to
work. '6 The meaning of the second clause has been contested,61 and was only recently
clarified by the Supreme Court in the Young decision.62 Before Young, the Sixth Circuit
interpreted the command that employers "shall" treat pregnant workers "the same"
as similarly impaired non-pregnant workers to mean that employers were required to
provide the same accommodations for pregnancy-related impairments as for similar
non-pregnancy-related impairments, regardless of the source of the impairment.63 Similarly,
some scholars have argued that this clause provides a "comparative right of access to
accommodations ,' 64 noting that it emphasizes the usual equal treatment rule of Title VII. 65
But many other courts declined to recognize a meaningful distinction between the two
clauses of the PDA, holding that the second clause permits employers to enact policies
that provide workplace accommodations to some workers with impairments, but not
59 See Widiss, supra note 12, at 997.
60 § 2000e(k).
61 CompareYoung v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437(4th Cir. 2013), Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare,
LLC, 656 F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 2011), Spivey v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 196 F.3d 1309 (1lth Cir. 1999), andUrbano
v. United Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204 (5th Cir. 1998), with Ensley-Gaines v. Runyon, 100 F.3d 1220 (6th
Cir. 1996).
62 See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1338 (2015).
63 Ensley-Gaines, 100 F.3d at 1226. In addition, the Sixth Circuit was not concerned that the source of the
requirement to accommodate the similarly impaired non-pregnant workers in that case was another federal
statute, and not just an employer policy. See infra Part II.A.2 for a more detailed discussion of this case and
that issue.
64 Grossman & Thomas, supra note 4, at 33-34; see also Widiss, supra note 12, at 2.
65 Indeed, the PDA emerged at the height of the "equal treatment"/"special treatment" debate among
feminist scholars. Feminists have long debated whether the path to gender equality is paved by "special
treatment," (which holds that biological and sociological differences between women and men require the law
to treat them differently), or by "equal treatment" (which holds that women will achieve equality only when
they are treated the same as men). See Wendy W. Williams, Notes From a First Generation, 1989 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 99 (describing and summarizing the debate). With its focus on same treatment, the PDA is generally
considered a victory for the "equal treatment" camp. Widiss, supra note 12, at 5.
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to pregnant workers.66 As I will discuss below, the Supreme Court addressed this issue
squarely in Young, and clarified that the second clause of the PDA does, in fact, require
employers to accommodate pregnant employees in the same ways that they accommodate
similarly-impaired, non-pregnant employees, under many circumstances. 67
Pregnancy discrimination plaintiffs must prove their cases like other Title VII plaintiffs,
and they almost always allege disparate treatment-that is, intentional discrimination
based on a protected characteristic-since courts are generally inhospitable to disparate
impact pregnancy discrimination claims. 68 Thus, unless a pregnancy discrimination
plaintiff can establish direct evidence of discrimination, she must satisfy the McDonnell
Douglas framework for disparate treatment claims. 69 This framework has three parts: first,
the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination; second, the employer may
produce a "legitimate nondiscriminatory reason" that explains the apparent discrimination;
and third, the plaintiff must prove that the reason offered by the employer is actually a
pretext for discrimination.70
66 See, e.g., Young, 707 F.3d at 447 ("Although the second clause can be read broadly, we conclude that...
it does not create a distinct and independent cause of action."); see also Widiss, supra note 12, at 34 (discussing
the issue). I note, however, that even before Young, the Supreme Court had stated that the second clause of
the PDA had substantive significance. See UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 204 (1991) (noting
that the PDA's second clause requires that pregnant workers be treated like similarly capable non-pregnant
workers); Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285 (1987) ("[W]e believe that the second
clause was intended to ... illustrate how discrimination against pregnancy is to be remedied . . . .") (quoting
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678 n. 14 (1983) ("The meaning of the
first clause is not limited by the specific language in the second clause, which explains the application of the
general principle to women employees.")).
67 Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354-55.
68 In a small number of cases, courts have allowed pregnancy discrimination disparate impact claims to
advance. See, e.g., EEOC v. Warshawsky & Co., 768 F. Supp. 647, 655 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding that employer
sick-leave policy had unlawful disparate impact when it resulted in the firing of 95.2% of pregnant workers).
Still, many courts have rejected disparate impact claims as underhanded attempts to secure preferential
treatment for pregnant workers. See Grossman & Thomas, supra note 4, at 42. See generally Reva Siegel,
Note, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 94 YALE L.J. 929, 935 (1985)
(arguing that a disparate impact cause of action for pregnancy discrimination is available and should be used).
69 Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1345.
70 Id. A number of scholars and judges have criticized the McDonnell Douglas framework for overly
complicating antidiscrimination claims and for hamstringing plaintiffs who experienced discrimination but who
cannot provide adequate comparators. See generally Goldberg, supra note 17; see also Coleman v. Donahoe,
667 F.3d 835, 863 (7th Cir. 2012) (Wood, J., concurring) (decrying the McDonnell Douglas framework as
having "lost [its] utility" and arguing for a simpler alternative).
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To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she is a member of
a protected class; (2) she performed her job satisfactorily; (3) she suffered an adverse
employment action; and (4) the circumstances give rise to an inference of unlawful
discrimination. 71 To raise an inference of unlawful discrimination, courts often require a
plaintiff to show that the employer treated her less favorably than a "similarly situated
comparator," usually another employee with similar responsibilities who does not possess
the protected characteristic.72 A woman alleging sex discrimination in hiring, for instance,
might be required to show that a man with similar qualifications was treated more favorably
in the selection process. While comparators are not strictly necessary to establish a prima
facie case, 3 the courts' general preference for comparators, coupled with the expressly
comparative language of the PDA, has made them a virtually required component of
pregnancy discrimination lawsuits.74 Thus, whether ADA-covered employees are available
as comparators for PDA plaintiffs is critical to the availability of PDA claims at all.
C. Young v. UPS: Clarifying the PDA
In Young, the Supreme Court clarified the meaning of second clause of the PDA,
and at the same time reinforced the centrality of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework to pregnancy discrimination claims.75 Peggy Young worked as a driver for UPS,
and her job required her to be able to lift and load parcels weighing up to seventy pounds
on her own.76 After suffering several miscarriages, she became pregnant in 2006, and her
doctor instructed that she should not lift more than twenty pounds during the first twenty
weeks of her pregnancy, and no more than ten pounds for the rest of her pregnancy 77 UPS
71 Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1345; St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993); Tex. Dep't of
Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
72 See, e.g., Troupe v. May Dep't Stores, 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994) (describing the need for a
"hypothetical Mr. Troupe" as a comparator); see also Williams et al., supra note 12, at 102.
73 E.g., Price v. UTI, No. 4:110CV01427 CAS, 2013 WL 798014, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 5, 2013) (citing
Wierman v. Casey's Gen. Stores, 638 F.3d 984, 993 (8th Cir. 2011)); see also Williams et al., supra note 12,
at 108.
74 See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437, 449-50 (4th Cir. 2013) (characterizing the fourth
step of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine-Hicks prima facie case as a requirement to produce a comparator),
vacated, 135 S. Ct. 1338; see generally Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, supra note 17.
75 Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1353-55.
76 Id. at 1344.
77 Id.
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informed Young that she could not work with those restrictions and denied her a light-duty
accommodation, so she stayed home without pay, eventually losing her employer-provided
medical coverage. 78 She filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC in 2007, and filed suit
against UPS in 2008. 71
At the time, UPS's policies required it to provide light-duty accommodations like
the one sought by Young under only three circumstances: (1) when an employee became
injured on the job; (2) when an employee was disabled under the ADA; and (3) when an
employee lost her driving certification.80 Therefore, UPS argued, it had not discriminated
against Young based on her pregnancy, but rather had treated her like all other workers
who, like Young, did not fall into any of the three neutral categories that would entitle a
worker to an accommodation.81 The district court granted summary judgment to UPS,8 2 and
the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 83
As the Supreme Court observed, the dispute between Young and UPS centered on
the interpretation of the second clause of the PDA, which provides that "women affected
by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all
employment-related purposes . . .as other persons not so affected but similar in their
ability or inability to work."84 UPS's policy treated pregnant workers less favorably than
some similarly situated non-pregnant workers, but on the basis of criteria that the Court
deemed "facially neutral."85 The Court noted that it was not apparent from the "same
treatment" language of the second clause of the PDA what, exactly, a court (or, presumably,
an employer) was to do in that situation: Did the second clause require "courts [to] compare
78 Id.
79 Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. DKC 08-2586, 2011 WL 665321, at *6 (D. Md. Feb. 14, 2011).
80 Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1344. UPS voluntarily changed this policy effective January 1, 2015, while the
Young case was pending before the Supreme Court. Brigid Schulte, With Supreme Court Case Pending, UPS
Reverses Policy on Pregnant Workers, WASH. POST (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
she-the-people/wp/2014/10/29/with-supreme-court-case-pending-ups-reverses-policy-on-pregnant-workers
[http://penna.cc/XVQ3-MM4E].
81 Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1344.
82 Young, 2011 WL 665321, at *22.
83 Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437, 451 (4th Cir. 2013).
84 Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1348 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)) (emphasis in original quotation).
85 Id. at 1349.
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workers only in respect to the work limitations that they suffer?"8 6 Or might "courts, when
deciding who the relevant 'other persons' are, .. consider other similarities and differences
as well?"87
The parties in Young adopted "almost polar opposite" positions on these questions, and
the Court rejected them both.88 Young argued that the second clause of the PDA required
employers to provide the same accommodations to pregnant workers with impairments
that they extended to some workers with impairments unrelated to pregnancy, even if other
similarly impaired, non-pregnant workers would not be accommodated. 9 The Court found
that Young's approach would unwarrantedly "grant pregnant workers a 'most-favored-
nation' status," requiring employers to accommodate pregnant workers any time they
provided even "one or two workers with an accommodation."90 The Court noted that the
second clause of the PDA stated pregnant workers should be treated the same as "other
persons," but not "any other persons," and that the statute does not "specify which other
persons Congress had in mind."91 And the Court reinforced the principle that "disparate-
treatment law normally permits an employer to implement policies that are not intended
to harm members of a protected class, even if their implementation sometimes harms
those members, as long as the employer has a legitimate, nondiscriminatory, nonpretextual
reason for doing so." 92
UPS contended that the second clause of the PDA simply defined pregnancy
discrimination as a form of sex discrimination, and therefore required courts to "compare
the accommodations an employer provides to pregnant women with the accommodations it
provides to others within a facially neutral category (such as those with off-the-job injuries)
86 Id. at 1348-49.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 1349.
89 Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1349.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 1350.
92 Id. The Court also declined to defer to the government on the grounds that the EEOC's 2014 pregnancy
discrimination guidance-which expressed the interpretation promoted by Young-had been enacted only
after the Court granted certiorari in Young, and was "inconsistent with positions the Government ha[d] long
advocated." Id. at 1352.
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to determine whether the employer has violated Title VII." 93 But the Court found that it
was the first clause of the PDA that established pregnancy discrimination to be a form
of sex discrimination, and so UPS's reading was incorrect because it would render the
second clause superfluous. 94 In addition, the Court stated that UPS's interpretation would
undermine the express intent of Congress when it enacted the PDA because it would not
overturn the Gilbert decision in full.95
The Court then presented its own interpretation of the second clause of the PDA. First,
the Court emphasized that "an individual pregnant worker who seeks to show disparate
treatment through indirect evidence may do so through application of the McDonnell
Douglas framework."' 96 The Court further explained that a pregnancy discrimination
plaintiff can establish a prima facie case "by showing ... that she belongs to the protected
class, that she sought accommodation, that the employer did not accommodate her, and
that the employer did accommodate others 'similar in their ability or inability to work."' 97
Then, the employer may respond with a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory" explanation for
denying the accommodation. 98
The Court stated that a plaintiff can carry her burden to rebut the employer's explanation
and raise an inference of intentional discrimination by showing that "the employer's policies
impose a significant burden on pregnant workers" that the proffered nondiscriminatory
reason does not justify. 99 It further explained that a pregnancy discrimination plaintiff may
seek to prove that an employer policy places a "significant burden" on pregnant workers
"by providing evidence that the employer accommodates a large percentage of nonpregnant
93 Id. at 1349.
94 Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1352.
95 Id. at 1353. The Court also noted that it had previously found that the second clause had a different
meaning than the first in California Federal Savings and Loan Association v Guerra, when the Court stated
that the second clause "was intended to overrule the holding in Gilbert and to illustrate how discrimination
against pregnancy is to be remedied." Id. (quoting Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 284
(1987)).
96 Id.
97 Id. at 1354.
98 Id.
99 Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354.
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workers while failing to accommodate a large percentage of pregnant workers." 100 And the
Court emphasized that "a plaintiff may rebut an employer's proffered justifications by
showing how a policy operates in practice." 101 The Court then vacated the Fourth Circuit's
opinion and remanded the case. 102
The Supreme Court's "significant burden" approach carved a middle path between
the parties' dueling interpretations of the second clause of the PDA. The Court confirmed,
however, that the second clause has independent meaning and force, and that it requires
employers to treat pregnant workers the same as other workers in many cases. This
holding underscores the significant role that comparisons between pregnant and non-
pregnant workers will play in future PDA cases. It remains to be seen how the Young
rule will be applied in practice, or how high of a hurdle plaintiffs will have to clear to
prove that a "substantial burden" exists. But it is apparent even now that future pregnancy
discrimination plaintiffs' cases will likely hinge on comparisons between pregnant workers
and non-pregnant workers with similar impairments.
D. The ADAAA: Clarifying the ADA
1. The ADA's Expanded Definition of Disability
The ADA, enacted in 1990 and amended in 2008, prohibits discrimination on the basis
of disability. 103 In addition, and unlike the PDA, the ADA requires employers to reasonably
accommodate employees with disabilities unless the accommodations would constitute an
"undue hardship." 104 Until recently, however, courts construed the ADA narrowly, under
instructions from the Supreme Court that "disability" should "be interpreted ... to create
a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled." 105 Then, in 2008, Congress repudiated
this cramped interpretation of the ADA with the ADAAA. 106 The "Findings and Purposes"
100 Id.
101 Id. at 1355.
102 Id. at 1355-56.
103 42U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117(2012).
104 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012). See Grossman & Thomas, supra note 4, at 33-34 (explaining that
the PDA does not create affirmative rights).
105 Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002).
106 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, §§ 2(a)-(b), 122 Stat. 3553 (codified as
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section of the Act expresses Congress' intent to reject Supreme Court precedents that had
sharply limited the availability of ADA protections. 107
The ADAAA dramatically expanded the ADA, broadening its definition of "disability"
and expressly extending its protections to previously excluded conditions.1' 8 Before the
ADAAA, the Supreme Court interpreted the ADA's definition of disability so narrowly that
the statute only helped the subset of Americans who are so severely disabled that they are
generally unable to work.109 The amended ADA expanded the definition of "disability" to
mean: "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities ... ; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an
impairment .. ."110 The statute's non-exclusive list of "major life activies" now includes
"performing manual tasks" and "sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, [and] bending." '
The statute also clarifies that a disability need not last longer than six months to qualify for
ADA coverage. 112 These changes led courts to apply the ADA to temporary conditions like
back and ankle injuries, 113 which would not have been covered by the pre-amendment ADA
because they were either too temporary or too minor.114
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117).
107 Id.
108 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(4) (2011) ("The purpose of the ADAAA is to make it easier for people with
disabilities to obtain protection under the ADA .... [T]he definition of 'disability' . . . shall be construed
broadly in favor of expansive coverage to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA.")
109 Ruth Colker, The Mythic 43 Million Americans with Disabilities, 49 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 10 (2007).
110 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(C) (2012).
111 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2012).
112 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (2012) ("The effects of an impairment lasting or expecting to last fewer than
six months can be substantially limiting within the meaning of this section.").
113 See, e.g., Cohen v. CHLN, Inc., No. 10-00514, 2011 WL 2713737, at *7-8 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 2011) (back
injury); Fleck v. WILMAC Corp., No. 10-05562, 2011 WL 1899198, at *1, *6 (E.D. Pa. May 19, 2011) (ankle
injury). Notably, not every court has embraced the ADAs loosened standard so vigorously. See, e.g., Peoples
v. Langley/Empire Candle Co., No. 11-2469-CM-JPO, 2012 WL 171340 (D. Kan. Jan. 20, 2012) (relying on
pre-ADAAA cases to hold recovery from hernia repair surgery was not an ADA-covered disability).
114 E.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 203 (2002) (holding that a worker's chronic
carpal tunnel syndrome was not sufficiently disabling to receive ADA coverage); see also Williams et al., supra
note 12, at 130-35 (collecting cases).
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2. The ADA and Pregnancy
Scholars have long debated the relationship between pregnancy and disability,115 and
the ADAAA has reinvigorated that discussion.116 Given the widened scope of the amended
ADA, some scholars argue that pregnancy itself should now be covered by the ADA. 117
After all, many of the "major life activities" referenced in the amended ADA are also
activities that pregnant women may find difficult, such as "sleeping, walking, standing,
lifting, [and] bending." '118 In particular, Professor Jeanette Cox has compellingly argued
that the amended ADA should cover pregnancy itself, and not just some pregnancy-related
impairments.119 She contends that because the ADA now covers similarly temporary
and low-stigma conditions, and because the "social model" of disability suggests that
pregnancy, like traditional disabilities, creates social and economic disadvantages for
pregnant workers, pregnancy now properly fits within the ADA. 121
Still, the weight of authority is against the view that pregnancy qualifies as a disability. 121
Historically and in recent cases, courts have held that pregnancy cannot be a disability since
115 See, e.g., Jennifer Gottschalk, Accommodating Pregnancy on the Job, 45 U. KAN. L. REv. 241 (1996)
(concluding that reinterpretation of Title VII, not the ADA, is the best way to secure workplace accommodations
for pregnant employees); Judith G. Greenberg, The Pregnancy Discrimination Act: Legitimating Discrimination
Against Pregnant Women in the Workforce, 50 ME. L. REV. 225, 250 (1998) (arguing that incorporating
pregnancy into the ADA would promote stereotypes about pregnant workers); Colette G. Matzzie, Note,
Substantive Equality and Antidiscrimination: Accommodating Pregnancy Under the ADA, 82 GEo. L.J. 193,
194-98 (Nov. 1993) (arguing that the ADA should be understood to cover pregnancy); D'Andra Millsap,
Comment, Reasonable Accommodation of Pregnancy in the Workplace: A Proposal to Amend the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, 32 Hous. L. REV. 1411, 1450 (1995-1996) (arguing that the ADA cannot accommodate
pregnancy and so Congress should amend the PDA).
116 See, e.g., Sheerine Alemzadeh, Claiming Disability, Reclaiming Pregnancy: A Critical Analysis of the
ADA Pregnancy Exclusion, 27 Wis. J.L. GENDER & Soc'y 1 (2012); Cox, supra note 12; Anastasia Latsos,
ADA Reform and Stork Parking: A Glimmer of Hope for the Pregnant, 32 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 193 (2011). In
addition, for an in-depth analysis of the ADAAA and its relationship to pregnancy discrimination claims, see
Williams et al., supra note 12.
117 Cox, supra note 12, at 449-50.
118 See Calloway, supra note 35; see also Williams et al., supra note 12, at 142-48 (appendix entitled "Some
Pregnancy Conditions That Commonly Give Rise to the Need for Workplace Accommodations").
119 Cox, supranote 12, at451-52.
120 Cox, supra note 12, at 451-52. Notably, the Congress that enacted the PDA may have shared Professor
Cox's view that pregnancy should be considered a disability. See infra notes 185-190 and accompanying text.
121 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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it is "the natural consequence of a properly functioning reproductive system" 12 2 and is
"often a voluntarily undertaken and desired condition." 123 Moreover, after the enactment of
the ADAAA, the EEOC promulgated guidance stating that "conditions, such as pregnancy,
that are not the result of a physiological disorder are . . . not impairments" under the
ADA. 124 And some scholars have worried that tying pregnancy to disability will promote
certain negative stereotypes about pregnant workers. 125 The ongoing insistence of courts,
the EEOC, and some scholars that pregnancy is categorically different from disability
makes it unlikely that the pregnancy-as-disability approach will take hold.
Although the EEOC has expressly stated that pregnancy itself should not be considered
a disability under the amended ADA, the agency has also asserted that pregnancy-related
impairments might rise to the level of the disabilities covered under the newly amended
ADA. 126 Three recent decisions and an EEOC settlement, all of which arose under the
amended ADA, recognized this line of reasoning. 127 In Price v. UTI, Jennifer Price, who
suffered from pregnancy-related complications, alleged that her employer discriminated
against her based on her pregnancy in violation of Title VII and violated the ADA by
122 Gudenkaufv. Stauffer Commc'ns, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 465, 473 (D. Kan. 1996).
123 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976); see also Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656
F.3d 540, 553 (7th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases holding that "absent unusual circumstances, [pregnancy] is not
a physical impairment").
124 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (2011).
125 E.g., Greenberg, supra note 115, at 250. As I will argue below, to the extent that this threat of stereotyping
pregnant workers exists, the problem has now been inverted: unless pregnant workers are able to use ADA-
covered workers as comparators, they will find it nearly impossible to establish PDA claims, and thus risk
segregation and stereotyping as an unemployable class. See infra Part III.B.
126 2015 EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 10, at II.A; see also Williams et al., supra note 12, at
113-17 (collecting cases and examples, and terming this approach to pregnancy discrimination claims the
"impairment theory").
127 See Price v. UTI, No. 4:110CV01427 CAS, 2013 WL 798014, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 5, 2013) (denying
summary judgment to employer where a plaintiff impaired by pregnancy-related complications had brought
claims under both Title VII and the ADA); Nayak v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., No. 1: 12-cv-
0817-RLY-MJD, 2013 WL 121838, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 9, 2013) (denying summary judgment to employer
regarding plaintiff's pregnancy-related ADA claim); Alexander v. Trilogy Health Servs., LLC, No. 1:11-cv-
295, 2012 WL 5268701, at *9, *12 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 23, 2012) (denying summary judgment to employer on
plaintiff's PDA claim and granting summary judgment to plaintiff on her ADA claim, which was based on
pregnancy-related hypertension); see also Williams et al., supra note 12, at 131-33 (discussing the Price and
Nayak cases, as well as others that apply the ADAAA). Because the ADAAA is not retroactive, there are still
relatively few pregnancy-related cases to which the amended ADA could apply.
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failing to accommodate her impairments. 128 The court denied the employer's motion for
summary judgment on both claims, 129 stating that, under the amended ADA, "a 'physical
impairment' includes any physiological disorder or condition that affects the reproductive
systems, which can be ...related to pregnancy." 130 Similarly, in Nayak v. St. Vincent
Hospital, Seema Nayak's ADA claim based on pregnancy-related bed rest and post-partum
complications survived summary judgment. 131 And in Alexander v. Trilogy Health Services,
the court actually granted partial summary judgment for plaintiff Tasha Alexander, who
experienced pregnancy-related disability discrimination in violation of the ADA based
on her preeclampsia. 13 2 Finally, the EEOC recently won a large settlement in an action
alleging both pregnancy and disability discrimination against an employer who refused to
accommodate a pregnant worker suffering from severe nausea.133
Even though a few district courts and the EEOC have embraced the notion that the
ADA may cover pregnancy-related ailments, other courts have declined to do so. 134 In
Selkow v. 7-Eleven, for example, a court held that Katie Selkow's lifting restrictions due to
"pregnancy-related back pains" did not "substantially limit[] [her] in performing a major
life activity," rendering her ineligible for ADA coverage.135 This decision was arguably
incorrect, given that the EEOC has identified lifting as a "major life activity" under the
ADA,136 and that other courts have held that even minor lifting restrictions may qualify
128 Price, 2013 WL 798014, at *1.
129 Id. at *2-3.
130 Id. at *3.
131 Nayak, 2013 WL 121838, at *3.
132 Alexander, 2012 WL 5268701, at *11-12.
133 Press Release, EEOC, EDSI to Pay $70,000 to Settle EEOC Pregnancy & Disability Discrimination Suit
(Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/4- 15-13.cfm [http://penna.cc/NHN3-V6X9].
134 Although EEOC guidance is due "great deference" by courts, it is not binding, and courts routinely
disregard it. See, e.g., Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1351-52 (2015); Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140-41 (1976).
135 Selkow v. 7-Eleven, Inc., No. 8:11-cv-456-T-33EAJ, 2012 WL 2054872, at * 15 (M.D. Fla. June 7, 2012).
136 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i) (2011).
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for coverage under the amended ADA. 13 7 Still, the Selkow opinion, and others like it,138
arise in the context of courts' longstanding practice of refusing to provide ADA relief for
pregnancy-related ailments except in "extremely rare cases." '139 Although some courts
appear to have accepted Congress's invitation to construe the ADA's coverage broadly,
decisions like Nayak and Alexander might also be rationalized as such "rare cases" because
both concerned particularly severe, and possibly life-threatening, impairments. 140 Courts
may continue to refuse to extend ADA coverage to less medically severe impairments
when they arise from pregnancy, perpetuating what Professor Joan C. Williams and her
co-authors have termed the "pregnancy-contamination doctrine." 141 Thus, it may be that
some courts will be more receptive to the use of ADA-covered comparators in PDA cases
than to the argument that a pregnancy-related impairment is, itself, a disability entitled to
reasonable accommodation under the ADA.
137 E.g., D'Entremont v. Atlas Health Care Linen Servs. Co., No. 1:12-CV-00070 (LEK/RFT), 2013 WL
998040, at *7 (N.D.N.Y Mar. 13, 2013) (denying employer's motion to dismiss where plaintiff suffered severe
back pain); Coffman v. Robert J. Young Co., No. 3:10-1052, 2011 WL 2174465, at *7 (M.D. Tenn. June 1,
2011) (denying employer's motion to dismiss where the plaintiff had suffered a non-work-related injury that
left her with a ten-pound lifting restriction).
138 E.g., Sam-Sekur v. Whitmore Grp., Ltd., No. ll-cv-4938(JFB)(GRB), 2012 WL 2244325, at *7
(E.D.N.Y June 15, 2012) (holding plaintiff's post-pregnancy illnesses, including multiple infections and
chronic cholecystitis, were too temporary to be "substantially limiting" under the amended ADA).
139 See Froehlich v. Holiday Org. Inc., No. 11 CV 2977(DRH)(WDW), 2012 WL 4483006, at * 6 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 27, 2012) (citation omitted).
140 The Price court did not specify the nature of the plaintiff's ailments, stating only that she experienced
"pregnancy-related complications" that abated after she gave birth. Price v. UTI, No. 4:110CV01427 CAS,
2013 WL 798014, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 5, 2013).
141 Williams et al., supra note 12, at 111. I further note that, even outside the pregnancy context, courts
are divided as to the extent that more minor impairments will receive coverage under the amended ADA.
Compare Cohen v. CHLN, Inc., No. 10-00514, 2011 WL 2713737, at *11 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 2011) (denying
summary judgment to employer based on non-pregnant plaintiff's ADA claim stemming from a back injury),
and Coffnan, 2011 WL 2174465, at *7 (denying employer's motion to dismiss where plaintiff had a ten-
pound lifting restriction), with Koller v. Riley Riper Hollin & Colagreco, 850 F. Supp. 2d. 502, 513-14 (E.D.
Pa. 2012) (granting summary judgment to employer and holding that plaintiff's many weeks of recovery and
rehabilitation from torn ACL was too minor and transitory to be covered by even the amended ADA), and
Farina v. Branford Bd. of Educ., No. 3:09-CV-49(JCH), 2010 WL 3829160, at *11 (D. Conn. Sept. 23, 2010)
(granting summary judgment to employer on grounds that plaintiff's fifteen-pound lifting restriction did not
"substantially limit[]" a major life activity under the amended ADA).
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II. Comparing Pregnancy and Disability Under Law
The ADA's expanded definition of "disability" should enable many pregnant workers
who are denied accommodations to point to similarly impaired employees with ADA
accommodations as comparators who were treated better.14 2 Given courts' traditional
reluctance to view pregnancy-related impairments as disabilities, as well as the Supreme
Court's emphasis in Young on the centrality of the McDonnell Douglas framework
to proving pregnancy discrimination claims, this expansion of the pool of comparators
available to PDA claimants may prove to be critical. Still, no court to date has permitted
a pregnancy discrimination claim to proceed on this theory. Moreover, some scholars,
and some pre-Young and pre-ADAAA cases, have suggested that comparisons between
pregnant workers and ADA-covered employees should not be permitted.
But, as scholars like Deborah A. Widiss have noted, if ADA-covered employees
cannot serve as comparators for PDA plaintiffs, then, ironically, the expansion of the
ADA's definition of "disability" would gut the PDA.143 This rule would shrink the pool
of comparators for PDA plaintiffs to almost no one, making it virtually impossible for
plaintiffs to identify a "large percentage" of non-pregnant, impaired workers who were
treated better because those workers would be covered by the ADA, and therefore
unavailable. 14 4 Moreover, pregnant workers might become the only temporarily impaired
workers not entitled to accommodations in the workplace. This result would run counter to
the courts' repeated command to treat pregnant workers like other employees, and it cannot
be the result Congress envisioned.
In this Part, I draw on case law and the legislative history of the PDA to show that
employees receiving ADA-mandated accommodations are appropriate comparators for
PDA plaintiffs.
A. Support From Mr. Troupe: ADA Comparators and PDA Precedent
Since the ADAAA was enacted, no court has squarely addressed whether PDA plaintiffs
142 I am not the first person to make this point. See, e.g., Brief of ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 26-30, Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2013) (No. 11-2078); Emily
Martin, Vice President and General Counsel of the National Women's Law Center, Written Testimony to the
EEOC (Feb. 2012); Widiss, supra note 12; Williams et al., supra note 12, at 119-23.
143 See Widiss, supra note 12, at 1024-25.
144 See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1388, 1354 (2015); Widiss, supra note 12, at 1024-25.
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may point to ADA-covered workers as comparators. Some earlier cases, however, suggest
that these comparisons might be inappropriate, 145 and a few scholars have contended
that those cases established a rule that PDA plaintiffs may not use ADA-accommodated
employees as comparators. 146 But even these pre-ADAAA, pre-Young cases-including
the now-vacated Fourth Circuit opinion in Young-did not expressly state that ADA
comparators were never available to PDA plaintiffs. Moreover, most other pre-ADAAA
cases suggest that these comparisons are entirely appropriate.
1. Cases that Cast Doubt on the Comparison
Scholars who suggest that PDA plaintiffs may be barred from using ADA comparators
cite two cases: Serednyl v. Beverly Healthcare from the Seventh Circuit and the Fourth
Circuit's now-vacated opinion in Young. 147
Victoria S erednyj was fired from herj ob at a nursing home after pregnancy complications
limited her ability to lift and move heavy objects, and she brought discrimination claims
under the ADA and the PDA.148 Although her complications were severe enough to require
two weeks of bed rest, her employer asserted that she was not disabled under the pre-
amendment ADA.149 The court agreed, and it further found that the employer's policy
of offering accommodations only to employees who were either injured on the job or
covered by the ADA was pregnancy-neutral, and thus not direct evidence of pregnancy
discrimination. 150 Moreover, because she could not point to a non-pregnant comparator
who had received better treatment, Serednyj could not establish a prima facie case under
the McDonnell Douglas framework. 151 So, her PDA claim failed. 152
145 See supra note 125; see also Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. DKC 08-2586, 2011 WL 665321
(D. Md. Feb. 14, 2011), aff'd, 707 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2013), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 1338; Serednyj v. Beverly
Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 553 (7th Cir. 2011).
146 See Brake & Grossman, supra note 25, at 95; Cox, supra note 12, at 469-71.
147 See Brake & Grossman, supra note 25, at 95; Cox, supra note 12, at 469-71.
148 Serednj, 656 F.3d at 546-47, 552.
149 Id. at 546, 556.
150 Id. at 548-49.
151 Id. at 552.
152 Id.
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The court did not, however, discuss whether employees who have ADA-covered
disabilities could ever serve as comparators for pregnant women with similar impairments.
This is most likely because the pre-amendment ADA did not reach most non-work-related
injuries.153 Thus, although Serednyj might be read to imply a bar on comparing disabled
and pregnant employees, it did not expressly hold that one existed.
Similarly, even before it was vacated by the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit opinion
in Young did not hold that ADA-covered employees could never serve as comparators for
PDA plaintiffs. The court stated that "a pregnant worker subject to a temporary lifting
restriction is not similar in her 'ability or inability to work' to an employee disabled
within the meaning of the ADA." '154 But the court went on to reason that a ruling for
Ms. Young would require UPS to treat a pregnant worker better than it would treat, for
example, an employee with a temporary lifting restriction who had "injured his back
while picking up his infant child," or "whose lifting limitation arose from her off-the-
job work as a volunteer firefighter." 155 These hypotheticals make it plain that the Fourth
Circuit did not announce a rule that would prevent comparisons between PDA plaintiffs
and individuals with temporary disabilities under the amended ADA, because the fictional
comparators with back injuries had precisely the types of disabilities that the ADAAA
was enacted to protect. 15 6 Perhaps that is why the court, surely aware of the newly enacted
ADAAA, stopped short of announcing a categorical bar on the use of ADA comparators in
PDA cases.
2. Cases that Support the Comparison
Even if some pre-ADAAA cases cast doubt on the ADA comparator question,
most suggest that these comparisons are appropriate. In Ensley-Gaines v. Runyon, the
Sixth Circuit expressly held that PDA plaintiffs may point to workers covered by a federal
disability statute as comparators. In addition, the reasoning of many other cases, including
In re Carnegie Associates from the Third Circuit and Troupe v. May Department Stores
from the Seventh Circuit, provides indirect support for the availability of ADA comparators
for PDA plaintiffs.
153 See Colker, The Mythic 43 Million with Disabilities, supra note 109.
154 Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437, 450 (4th Cir. 2013).
155 Id. at 448.
156 See supra notes 108-114 and accompanying text.
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In Ensley-Gaines, a Postal Service worker brought a pregnancy discrimination lawsuit
after being denied a temporary light duty assignment. 15 7 The Postal Service argued that
it did not have to provide Ms. Ensley-Gaines full accommodations because she was not
covered by the Federal Employee Compensation Act ("FECA"), a federal statute requiring
covered employers to compensate employees with employment-related injuries, regardless
of their ability or inability to work.158 The Postal Service further claimed that employees
accomodated under the FECA were not appropriate comparators in the Title VII case. 159
But the Sixth Circuit disagreed, holding that FECA-covered employees were perfectly
proper comparators, as they, too, were limited in their ability to work and had received
better treatment than Ms. Ensley-Gaines. 10 Therefore, Ms. Ensley-Gaines had established
a prima facie case of intentional discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework.
The court took no issue with the fact that FECA was a federal statute mandating protections
for covered employees.
The Third Circuit's decision in In re Carnegie Center Associates lends further support
to the argument that ADA- and PDA-covered employees can be compared. 161 In that case,
Deborah Rhett's secretarial position was eliminated as part of a reduction in force that
took place during her unpaid maternity leave. 162 Her employer argued that the PDA did not
prevent the company from terminating her employment during her maternity leave. 163 The
court agreed with the employer, noting that the PDA required employers to treat pregnant
women "in the same fashion as any other temporarily disabled employee." 164 The court
then "point[ed] out" that the ADA did not bar employers from discharging employees
away from work due to temporary disabilities as part a reduction in force. 165 Given that the
ADA would not have required the employer to save Ms. Rhett's job, the court reasoned,
157 Ensley-Gaines v. Runyon, 100 F.3d 1222, 1224 (6th Cir. 1996).
158 Id. at 1222-23.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 1226.
161 See In re Carnegie Ctr. Assocs., 129 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 1997).
162 Id. at 293.
163 Id. at 295.
164 129 F.3d at 297.
165 Id.
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it was also lawful under the PDA to discharge her.16 6 The PDA, after all, is about equal
treatment-not special treatment. 167
Thus, the court not only implied that comparisons between pregnant and disabled
workers were proper, but actually relied on such a comparison in its holding. A corollary
to this reasoning is that if the ADA had required the employer to save Ms. Rhett's job, the
PDA would have imported that same employment protection.
Perhaps no single pregnancy discrimination case better explains the PDA's equal
treatment rule than Judge Posner's opinion in Troupe v. May Department Stores. 168 Kimberly
Troupe was a saleswoman at a Chicago Lord & Taylor department store when she became
pregnant. 169 After Ms. Troupe's unusually severe morning sickness caused her to be late to
work on a regular basis, her employer terminated her. 170 The employer explained that she
was fired in part for tardiness and in part because Lord & Taylor assumed she would not
return to work after having her baby. 171 In denying relief to Ms. Troupe under Title VII,
Judge Posner explained that the PDA did not require employers to treat pregnant workers
any better than they treated non-pregnant but similarly impaired employees. 172 He then
famously offered the example of a "hypothetical Mr. Troupe," who was "as tardy as Ms.
Troupe was, also because of health problems, and who [was] about to take a protracted
sick leave growing out of those problems." 173 If the law did not require Lord & Taylor to
retain Mr. Troupe, the court reasoned, then the PDA would not require anything more for
Ms. Troupe. 174
166 Id.
167 See id ("[T]he PDA is a shield against discrimination, not a sword in the hands of a pregnant employee.").
168 20 F.3d 734, 734 (7th Cir. 1994).
169 Id. at 735.
170 Id. at 736.
171 Id. As Williams et al. note, the assumption that Troupe would not return to work after giving birth might
today be treated as evidence of bias sufficient to support the conclusion that she was fired because of her sex.
Williams et al., supra note 12, at 140.
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Although "Mr. Troupe" probably would not have been covered by the restrictive,
pre-amendment ADA, it is difficult to imagine that his ailments would not fall under the
amended ADA. Under the logic of Troupe, then, if Mr. Troupe would be accommodated
under the ADA, then accommodating Ms. Troupe's morning sickness would constitute the
equal treatment the PDA requires.
Cases like Troupe exemplify the pre-Young PDA case law because they rely on the
idea that the PDA requires employers to treat pregnant workers the same way they treat
non-pregnant employees, and no better.175 And the Supreme Court reinforced this
principle in Young when it rejected the notion that the PDA granted pregnant workers a
"most-favored-nation" status. 176
But the reasoning of these cases also suggests that just as pregnant workers may not be
treated better than their non-pregnant colleagues, they surely may not be treated worse. 177 To
prohibit comparisons between pregnant and ADA-covered workers, however, would be to
treat pregnant workers worse. This approach would shrink the pool of available comparators
to the vanishing point, thwarting pregnant workers' ability to identify a "large percentage"
of comparable non-pregnant workers with accommodations, and leaving them the only
temporarily impaired workers who are not accommodated. 178 This result would undermine
the equal-treatment rule emphasized in Troupe, In re Carnegie Associates, and even Young,
as well as the very purpose of the PDA.
B. Back to Gilbert: Support From Congress and Legislative History
Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act to repudiate the Gilbert decision
and to clarify that pregnancy discrimination violated Title VII. 179 But Congress also
175 See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285 (1987) ("Congress intended the PDA to
be 'a floor beneath which pregnancy disability benefits may not drop-not a ceiling above which they may not
rise."'); Spivey v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1313-14 (1 1th Cir. 1999); Urbano v. United Airlines,
Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 208 (5th Cir. 1998). See also supra note 65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
PDA's equal treatment goals.
176 Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1388, 1349 (2015).
177 See supra note 175.
178 See Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354; see also Widiss, supra note 12, at 1024-25.
179 See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
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explicitly recognized the relationship between pregnancy and disability,8 ° effectively
designating non-pregnant workers with impairments as the appropriate comparison group
for pregnant workers.181 The Gilbert decision itself concerned an employer's refusal to
provide disability benefits to pregnant women, 18 2 and the legislative history of the PDA is
rife with language comparing pregnant and disabled workers.18 3 Moreover, Congress was
plain in its intent that pregnant workers should be compared with-and treated no worse
than-their disabled colleagues. 184
As the legislative history of the PDA indicates, comparisons between pregnant and
disabled workers were top of mind for Congress: the word "disability" appears throughout
the official legislative history, and it is frequently used to describe pregnancy itself 185 For
example, while discussing Gilbert, Senator Williams criticized GE's disability plan for
"provid[ing] protection in the event of virtually every conceivable disability but one." '186
Likewise, Representative Hawkins characterized the PDA as legislation addressing
"pregnancy disability." '187 Unlike today's courts, the Congress that enacted the PDA did not
believe that pregnancy and disability were such starkly different conditions.
In addition, the congressional record makes plain that Congress wanted pregnant
workers to be compared to other workers based on the "actual effects of [pregnancy] on
their ability to work." '188 As the Senate Report states, the PDA requires employers to allow
pregnant women to work "on the same conditions as other employees" and to be "accorded
the same rights, leave privileges and other benefits, as other workers who are disabled from
180 See infra notes 185-190 and accompanying text.
181 Brief of Law Professors and Women's Rights Organizations as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
6, Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1226) [hereinafter Brief of Young
Amici].
182 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
183 See infra notes 185-190 and accompanying text.
184 See infra notes 185-190 and accompanying text.
185 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PDA, supra note 54.
186 S. REp. No. 54-748, at 2 (remarks of Sen. Williams); see also id. at 7 (remarks of Sen. Brooke) (criticizing
the Supreme Court for rejecting EEOC guidance that "pregnancy-related disabilities had to be treated the same
as any other temporary disability for all job-related purposes").
187 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PDA, supra note 54, at 11 (remarks of Congressman Hawkins).
188 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PDA, supra note 54, at 41.
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working." '189 Likewise, the House Report clarifies that, through the PDA, Congress sought
to ensure that pregnant workers would receive all of "the same benefits as those provided
other disabled workers. 19 °
One might argue that the later enactment of the ADA changes how courts should
understand the relationship between pregnancy and disability. For instance, it may be that
because the ADA does not require proof of discriminatory intent in the same ways as
Title VII, the comparisons Congress contemplated are no longer appropriate. Since many
employers only accommodate non-pregnant disabled employees because the ADA requires
them to do so, withholding accommodations from pregnant workers does not necessarily
indicate animus toward them. The Fourth Circuit suggested as much in Young, when it
effectively required pregnant workers to prove animus beyond the obvious disparate
treatment of pregnancy-related impairments. 191
This understanding of the relationship between the PDA and the ADA is contrary to
basic principles of statutory interpretation and to the plain intent of Congress. First, as
Professor Widiss points out, it is a "longstanding principle of statutory interpretation that
Congress is presumed to enact new legislation with a background knowledge of existing
legislation." 192 Congress was certainly aware of the PDA's "same treatment" requirement
when it enacted the ADA in 1990. But to distinguish disabled workers from pregnant
workers because Congress enacted the ADA would constitute a "repeal by implication" of
the PDA, which is "highly disfavored." 193 There is no evidence that Congress intended the
ADA to alter the PDA.
Moreover, although the ADA did not exist in 1978, there is no indication that Congress
intended PDA protections to be conditioned on the source of the disability protections
employers provided. Rather, Congress asked courts to focus on the similarity of pregnant
189 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PDA, supra note 54, at 41.
190 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PDA, supra note 54, at 151.
191 See Brief of Young Amici, supra note 181, at 14. The brief notes that the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Young affirmed the reasoning of the District Court, which had expressly stated that Ms. Young had failed to
demonstrate "animus directed specifically at pregnant women." Id. at 14-15; see also Young v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., No. DKC 08-2586, 2011 WL 665321, at *14 (D. Md. Feb. 14, 2011).
192 Widiss, supra note 12, at 53.
193 Widiss, supra note 12, at 54. As discussed above, a perverse consequence of the this approach would be
to shrink the protections of the PDA into virtual nonexistence. See supra Part II.
30.1 283
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW
workers to other workers with respect to their ability to work. 194 The later enactment of the
ADA should not alter Congress' command that employers should provide equal benefits to
pregnant and temporarily disabled workers.
III. Theorizing Pregnancy: Comparators, Intersectionality, and Solidarity
Comparing workers with pregnancy-related impairments to workers with other
impairments finds strong support in theoretical approaches to antidiscrimination law
that highlight the dangers of reinforcing identity differences in the workplace. First,
intersectionality theory reveals that current law fails to protect pregnant workers because
it sees pregnancy discrimination as a matter of pure sex discrimination.195 To address
the problem more fully, courts must recognize that pregnancy discrimination implicates
not only sex discrimination, but also discrimination based on ability. For that reason,
comparisons between pregnant and non-pregnant workers with impairments are actually
essential to redressing the problem of pregnancy discrimination.
Second, a newer theoretical approach that aims to "disrupt" 19 6 the processes by which
certain groups are regarded as, and treated as, different in the workplace also illuminates
the importance of the availability of ADA comparators to PDA plaintiffs. This approach
suggests that antidiscrimination law should be used to target workplace structures and
policies that operate to single out certain groups for differential treatment, and in so doing
make their prohibited characteristics more salient than they should be, creating divisions
among coworkers and leading to segregation and stereotyping. Under this view, if the law
treats pregnant workers differently than it treats similarly-impaired non-pregnant workers,
it invites precisely the kinds of stereotyping and segregation of pregnant women that the
PDA was enacted to prevent.
194 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PDA, supra note 54, at 150.
195 Kimberl6 Crenshaw first introduced the concept of intersectionality in 1989. See Crenshaw,
Demarginalizing the Intersection, supra note 28. At nearly the same time, Angela Harris addressed similar
ideas through the lens of anti-essentialism. See Harris, Race and Essentialism, supra note 9.
196 This term comes from Vicki Schultz, Antidiscrimination Law as Disruption: The Emergence of a New
Paradigm for Understanding and Addressing Discrimination (Apr. 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Schultz, Antidiscrimination Law as Disruption].
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A. Intersectionality Theory
Kimberl6 Crenshaw introduced the concept of intersectionality in 1989,197 and Angela
Harris addressed the same set of issues in 1990.191 Both argued that antidiscrimination law
failed to account for the specific harms that black women face, instead focusing on the
dominant experiences of sexism and racism: those of white women and black men. 199 They
explained that black women experience the compound harm of racism and sexism, which
is greater than-and different from-the sum of its parts.200 Because antidiscrimination law
did not account for this unique and complex form of discrimination, Professor Crenshaw
argued, courts failed to understand or remedy discrimination against black women.2 1
Professor Harris likewise cautioned against the use of the falsely universal category of
"woman," and argued that instead we should embrace the idea of "multiple consciousness":
the notion that women, as a group and as individuals, may have many identities.2 2 Both
theorists argued for an understanding of identity groups as coalitions of different kinds of
people with different life experience.2 3
Although intersectionality theory was developed in the context of considering the
situation of women of color, and of black women in particular, scholars have applied the
concept of intersectionality to many other areas of law, including disability and human
rights.20 4 I have been unable, however, to locate any scholarship applying intersectionality
197 Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection, supra note 28.
198 Harris, Race and Essentialism, supra note 9. Although Professor Harris did not use the term
"intersectionality" until later (see, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82
CALL. REv. 741, 767 (1994) [hereinafter Harris, The Jurisprudence ofReconstruction]), Race and Essentialism
embodied the concept by exposing the unique issues faced by people who belong to multiple identity groups.
199 Harris, The Jurisprudence ofReconstruction, supra note 198, at 151.
200 Harris, The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, supra note 198, at 140 ("Because the intersectional
experience is greater than the sum of racism and sexism, any analysis that does not take intersectionality into
account cannot sufficiently address the particular manner in which Black women are subordinated.").
201 Harris, The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, supra note 198, at 140.
202 Harris, Race and Essentialism, supra note 9, at 608.
203 Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against
Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241, 1299 (1991) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins].
204 See, e.g., Lisa A. Crooms, "To Establish My Legitimate Name Inside the Consciousness of Strangers ":
Critical Race Praxis, Progressive Women-of-Color Theorizing, and Human Rights, 46 How. L.J. 229, 243-44
(2003); Rangita de Silva de Alwis, Mining the Intersections: Advancing the Rights of Women and Children with
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theory to pregnancy discrimination. This omission in the literature is surprising because,
as I will illustrate below, pregnancy is best understood as an experience that lies at the
intersection of sex and disability. And just as courts have overlooked the complex harms
caused by the interaction of race and sex that intersectionality theorists described, so too
have courts ignored the complex harms caused at the intersection of sex and disability that
many pregnant workers experience.-
Pregnancy discrimination can also implicate other identities, and race and class in
particular. Historically, black women, unlike white women, were expected to continue
working during and after pregnancy and marriage-and they often had no choice but to
do so. 206 Indeed, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, poor black women
experienced markedly lower fertility rates and higher rates of stillbirth, in part because of
the backbreaking labor of sharecropping and other manual work.2 °7 Racial inequalities with
respect to pregnancy continue today, as indicated by cases like Flores, in which the plaintiff,
who was pregnant and Hispanic, was treated worse than coworkers who were pregnant
and white. 20 8 And class, too, comes into play in many pregnancy discrimination cases,
as the problem disproportionately burdens women in low-wage occupations. 2 9 Although
I focus specifically on the intersection of sex and disability in this Article, that focus
does not diminish the importance of these other historical and intersectional aspects of
pregnancy discrimination.
1. The Intersectional Nature of Pregnancy
Pregnancy discrimination is plainly a form of sex discrimination. But the location of
the PDA in Title VII should not prevent courts from recognizing that pregnant workers
Disabilities Within an Integrated Web of Human Rights, 18 PAC. Rim. L. & POL'Y J. 293, 294-95 (2009); Ribet,
supra note 34, at 185. Crenshaw also noted that the concept of intersectionality "can and should be expanded"
to include other factors. Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, supra note 203, at 1244 n.9.
205 The location of the PDA in Title VII doubtless contributes substantially to courts' disregard of the
disability-related aspects of pregnancy. Still, as I will discuss in Section III.A. I infra, the question addressed in
this paper-the propriety of ADA-PDA comparisons-offers courts the chance to recognize the intersectional
nature of pregnancy without requiring Congress to change the law.
206 Courtni E. Molnar, "Has the Millennium Yet Dawned? ": A History ofAttitudes TowardPregnant Workers
in America, 12 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 163, 168-69, 178 (2005).
207 Id.
208 Flores v. Home Depot, Inc., No. CIVA. 01-6908, 2003 WL 1793388, at *1 (D. Kan. June 9, 2009).
209 ERA REPORT, supra note 5, at 22; see also Schlichtmann, supra note 46.
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also face problems that women workers, as a group, do not.210 For example, most pregnant
women experience physical difficulties that do not affect women as a general population.2 n
In addition, pregnant workers face biases and stereotypes that do not affect non-pregnant
women workers.212 Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, pregnant women were
considered unfit for work, or even to be seen in public. 213 At the same time, however,
pregnancy and motherhood were viewed as a woman's "natural role"-or at least that of a
white, upper-class woman-and so pregnant women forced out of their jobs were unable
to collect unemployment compensation.214 Today, studies show that pregnant women are
viewed as "less committed to theirjobs, less dependable, and less authoritative, but warmer,
more emotional, and more irrational" than non-pregnant women.215 Thus, despite the PDA,
biases and negative attitudes toward pregnant workers continue to persist.216
Pregnancy is also related to disability because it can cause impairments that make it
difficult for pregnant workers to do their jobs in the same ways that other disabled workers
210 Of course, pregnancy discrimination is not the only form of sex discrimination that affects only a discrete
subclass of women. For another example, see Phillips v Martin Marietta Corporation, 400 U.S. 542, 544
(1971), in which the Court held that an employer's policy of not accepting job applications from women with
young children violated Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination.
211 See Calloway, supra note 35.
212 See Gayle Tzemach Lemmon, The Pregnancy Penalty: How Working Women Pay for Having Kids,
ATLANTIC (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/2012/12/the-pregnancy-penalty-how-
working-women-pay-for-having-kids/266239/ [http://penna.cc/X5UB-5EPA] (citing recent studies revealing
negative attitudes toward pregnant women in the workplace); Molnar, supra note 205 (historical views);
Williams et al., supra note 12, at 103. See also LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PDA, supra note 54, at 154 ("As
testimony received by this committee demonstrates, the assumption that women will become pregnant and
leave the labor force leads to the view of women as marginal workers, and is at the root of the discriminatory
practices which keep women in low-paying and dead-end jobs.").
213 Molnar, supra note 206, at 171 ("Policies requiring mandatory leaves of absence during pregnancy were
an outgrowth of the Victorian view that it was obscene for a pregnant woman to be seen in public.").
214 Molnar, supra note 206, at 172.
215 Lemmon, supranote 212.
216 Studies also indicate that these negative attitudes extend past pregnancy, to women with children as well.
See, e.g., Joan C. Williams & Amy J.C. Cuddy, Will Working Mothers Take Your Company to Court?, HARV.
BUS. REV., Sept. 2012, at 95, 96; Francois-Cerrah, supra note 1. In addition, American society remains sharply
conflicted as to whether it is "good" for mothers of children to work at all. WANG, PARKER & TAYLOR, supra
note 51 (reporting that while 67% of respondents believed working women have made it easier for families to
earn enough money, 74% believed that the increased number of working women makes it harder for parents
to raise children).
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sometimes have difficulties. It is not necessary to consider pregnancy to be a disability to
recognize the truth of this point. There are numerous similarities between pregnant workers
and the broadened class of workers now included under the amended ADA. A diabetic
employee may need to take periodic breaks to adjust his insulin levels, just as a pregnant
worker may need breaks to sit, stand, or use the bathroom. 217 An employee with a temporary
back injury may, like a pregnant worker, have a short-term doctor-ordered restriction onlifting, sitting, standing, or climbing. 218 And, like a pregnant woman, an employee with
sleep apnea may have difficulty sleeping that interferes with his ability to work.219 Pregnant
workers who experience disabilities are entirely "similar in their ability or inability to
work '220 to many disabled workers, as Congress has recognized.221
Furthermore, even if pregnancy itself is not an ADA disability, many employers view
pregnant workers as too disabled to work and treat them that way. In 200 1, for example,
new recruits to the District of Columbia Fire & EMS Department received letters warning
that if they suffered from any "medical disability" that adversely affected their ability to
do the job, they would not be hired.222 The "medical disabilities" listed that would preclude
employment included broken bones, infections, and pregnancy.223 This example, though
perhaps extreme, is but one of many instances of employers assuming pregnant workers
would be unable to fulfill their job duties simply by virtue of being pregnant. 224
217 See Cox, supra note 12, at 472 (explaining that "[t]he ADA now includes virtually all persons diagnosed
with diabetes").
218 See Mills v. Temple Univ., 869 F. Supp. 2d 609, 617, 622, 625 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (denying summary
judgment to employer on grounds that non-pregnant plaintiff, whose back problems led to restrictions on
"bending, lifting, filing, pushing or pulling and weight bearing activity," might qualify as disabled under the
amended ADA).
219 See Johnson v. Farmers Ins. Exch., No. CIV-11-963-C, 2012 WL 95387, at *1-2 (WD. Okla. Jan. 12,
2012) (denying employer's motion to dismiss on the grounds that it was possible the amended ADA would
encompass sleep apnea).
220 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).
221 See supra notes 189-194 and accompanying text.
222 Dana Page, D.C.FD.: An Equal Opportunity Employer As Long as You Are Not Pregnant, 24 WOMEN'S
RTs. L. REP. 9, 11 (2002).
223 Id.
224 Another example is found in Troupe: the employer based its firing of Ms. Troupe in part on the assumption
that she would not return to work after having her baby. Troupe v. May Dep't Stores, 20 F.3d 734, 736 (7th
Cir. 1994).
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2. Gaps in the Law and ADA Comparators
An analysis of pregnancy discrimination helps to explain why courts have so often
interpreted the PDA in ways that fail to protect pregnant workers.225 Perhaps the clearest
instance of these legal gaps is the issue of comparators, discussed at length in the sections
above. Pregnancy discrimination claimants usually have only a small number of available
comparators-non-pregnant workers who are similarly impaired and who received better
treatment-and courts have frequently made that pool even smaller by, for example,
imposing the requirement that comparators have "off the job" injuries.226 It may be that
courts sharply limit the pool of PDA comparators, and thus the relief available to PDA
plaintiffs, because they fail to recognize the intersectional aspects of pregnancy that overlap
with disability.
Unlike the courts, Congress seems to have understood the intersectional nature of
pregnancy. This is implicit in the history and structure of the PDA, which was enacted in
direct response to the exclusion of pregnant workers from an employer's disability benefits
plan.227 The inclusion of the comparative "same treatment" language in the PDA's text
further suggests that Congress understood pregnancy to implicate issues of both sex and
disability.
Thus, although the PDA is located in Title VII, courts, like Congress, are free to
recognize the aspects of pregnancy discrimination that differentiate it from pure sex
discrimination. Courts should view pregnancy discrimination as the product of the
unique interaction between stereotypes about women, stereotypes about pregnancy, and
the reality that pregnancy can sometimes cause impairments. When ailments associated
with pregnancy interfere with work, pregnant workers become like ADA-covered
temporarily disabled employees. The Supreme Court's suggestion in Young that impaired,
non-pregnant employees who received accommodations under UPS's policies-including
ADA-accommodated employees-might be proper comparators for a pregnancy
discrimination plaintiff acknowledges this point.228 Moreover, the intersectional nature
225 Crenshaw's critique of feminist theorists also finds parallels in the pregnancy discrimination context,
particularly with respect to the longstanding "equal treatment"/'special treatment debate." See supra note 65.
But neither of these approaches adequately addresses the intersectional nature of pregnancy as a question of
both sex and disability.
226 E.g., Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 548-49 (7th Cir. 2011).
227 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
228 See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1354 (2015) (noting that Young contendsed
30.1 289
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW
of pregnancy indicates that the availability of ADA comparators is essential to insuring
that the experience of pregnant workers is fully accounted for, and to acknowledging the
coalitional nature of this identity. Only by appreciating the fundamental overlap between
pregnancy discrimination and disability discrimination can courts ensure that the purposes
of the PDA are fulfilled.
B. Disruption Theory
In the last several years, a new approach to antidiscrimination law has emerged that
decries the reification of identity categories in even broader terms than does intersectionality
theory.229 In the words of Professor Vicki Schultz, this approach identifies the purpose of
antidiscrimination law as "not simply to protect preexisting groups, but rather to police
against practices that actually tend to divide people into dichotomous groups and to
create ... differences between those groups. ' 23" These difference-creating processes are
harmful because they lead to the very stereotyping and segregation that Congress sought
to eliminate through Title VII, and impede the development of solidarity across group
boundaries.231 Professor Schultz has theorized and championed this emerging approach,
labeling it "disruption" theory to capture the idea that antidiscrimination law should disrupt
the processes that create difference in the workplace.232 Professor Schultz and others call
for a legal approach that targets difference-creating workplace practices as appropriate
sites for Title VII intervention, and aspires to replace them with mechanisms and incentives
for people to identify with each other across "difference. '"233
that she could show that UPS failed to accommodate pregnant workers even though it accommodated "most
nonpregnant employees with lifting limitations").
229 See, e.g., RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RACIAL CULTURE 25-28 (2004); Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About
Women and Work, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1749 (1990); Noah Zatz, Beyond the Zero-Sum Game: Toward Title
VI Protection for Intergroup Solidarity, 77 IND. L.J. 63, 114 (2002); Schultz, Antidiscrimination Law as
Disruption, supra note 196.
230 Schultz, Antidiscrimination Law as Disruption, supra note 196, at 2.
231 See, e.g., Zatz, Beyond the Zero-Sum Game, supra note 229, at 123-24 (arguing Title VII should protect
cross-group solidarity in the workplace).
232 See Schultz, Antidiscrimination Law as Disruption, supra note 196.
233 Another example of this approach can be found in the work of Noah Zatz. E.g., Zatz, Beyond the Zero-
Sum Game, supra note 229. Professor Zatz argues that Title VII should be interpreted to provide more robust
protections for cross-race and cross-sex alliances. See supra note 229, at 69. Current interpretations of Title VII,
he says, create a "zero-sum game" that pits different groups against one another in the workplace and denies
the possibility of simultaneous discrimination against members of different groups. See supra note 229, at 69.
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1. Disrupting Pregnancy Discrimination
Applying disruption theory to the problem of pregnancy discrimination makes it clear
that a failure to recognize the similarities between pregnant and ADA-covered workers
may create precisely the types of divisions that lead to stereotyping and discrimination.
Whether pregnancy qualifies as a disability at a metaphysical level is irrelevant; what
matters is whether pregnancy-related impairments interfere with a pregnant woman's
job performance any more than similar impairments interfere with the work of non-
pregnant, disabled workers. If a pregnant woman's ability to work is the same as that of
a similarly impaired non-pregnant colleague, to treat her any differently is the essence of
discrimination.234
Notably, under disruption theory, a policy that favored pregnant workers with
impairments over other impaired workers-such as the "most-favored-nation" approach
rejected by the Supreme Court in Young-would also undermine antidiscrimination goals.
Disruption theory calls for a focus on uniting employees across boundaries, including sex
and disability: there is no reason why pregnant workers with impairments should be treated
better than non-pregnant workers with similar impairments, but neither should they be
treated worse.235 To treat either group unequally incites the disfavored group to resentment,
impeding the development of affinity across boundaries. Moreover, emphasizing
that both groups experience temporary ailments that affect their ability to work finds
support in Justice Brennan's dissent in Gilbert, which Congress codified through the
PDA,236 and remains true to the underlying spirit of Title VII and antidiscrimination law
generally.237 Instead of differentiating people based on the source of their impairments,
the law should encourage pregnant and disabled workers to recognize their fundamental
similarities and to stand in solidarity with each other as colleagues who are entitled to the
same respect and protections.
234 This view again echoes the equal treatment view articulated by the PDA itself. See supra note 65 and
accompanying text.
235 In this way, this emerging approach echoes many of the well-established PDA cases emphasizing equal
treatment. See infra Part II.A.2.
236 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PDA, supra note 54 and accompanying text. See also Gen. Elec. Co.
v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 160 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Title VII's purpose of creating equal
employment opportunity).
237 For example, in enacting a Title VII exception for "bona fide occupational qualifications," or BFOQ,
Congress acknowledged that a worker's ability to actually do her job is paramount. See UAW v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 195-96 (1991) (discussing the BFOQ exception).
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2. Disruption and ADA Comparators
Thus, like intersectionality theory, disruption theory counsels for the use of ADA
comparators in PDA cases. If courts were to find that ADA comparators were barred in
PDA cases, pregnant workers would rapidly become the only employees who could be
fired for impairments akin to temporary disabilities.238 Pregnant workers would be marked
as "different" and less able than their colleagues, even those with similar work limitations,
because of the different treatment they would receive at work. Over time, as more and
more pregnant women were forced out of their jobs, a new equilibrium would develop
that reinforced stereotypes about pregnant women as less dependable, less committed to
working, and more focused on home and family life.239
Ultimately, this exodus of pregnant workers would effectively segregate pregnant
workers out of certain occupations. As Professor Schultz has argued, the greater the degree
of job segregation found within a workplace, the more particular jobs become identified
with the predominant group and the stereotypes and expectations that accompany that
group.24° If certain roles or workplaces become more inhospitable to pregnant workers,
this will only solidify the idea that pregnant women simply do not do that particular job.241
Under disruption theory, the availability of ADA comparators is also important to
encourage pregnant and disabled workers to express solidarity with each other.242 When
pregnant workers receive accommodations for minor illnesses experienced during
their pregnancies, there will be less room for resentment and backlash if others who
238 While some of these impairments may themselves become recognized as disabilities under the ADA,
it is equally plausible that this will not happen, given courts' traditional reluctance to view pregnancy-related
impairments as disabilities. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
239 See supra Part III.A. 1. It is also possible that this segregation could affect workers who are mothers
as well, since they face similar stereotypes about their competency and dedication. See Williams & Cuddy,
supra note 216 (citing study finding that women who were mothers were judged to be less competent and less
likely to be hired than their colleagues). Thus, comparing pregnancy to other conditions that require minor
accommodations may have the beneficial effect of reducing stereotyping not only about pregnant workers, but
also about all women with children.
240 Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1760 (1998).
241 The amicus brief by law professors and women's rights organizations in Young argued that Congress, too,
understood pregnancy discrimination as a problem rooted in stereotypes, which formed the basis of its "same
treatment" requirement. Brief of Young Amici, supra note 181, at 15-16.
242 Cf Zatz, supra note 229, at 123-24 (arguing Title VII should promote cross-group solidarity).
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experience similar illnesses-or may do so someday-know that they, too, will receive the
accommodations necessary to keep theirjobs. Thus, in this context, encouraging employers
to provide the same treatment to both pregnant and non-pregnant workers who have minor
or temporary disabilities can help undermine the "zero-sum game" that creates inter-group
competition and hostility,243 and encourage pregnant and non-pregnant disabled workers to
recognize themselves in each other.244
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Young highlights the inherently comparative nature of
pregnancy discrimination claims. But pregnancy discrimination plaintiffs have struggled
to produce acceptable comparator evidence because courts often require that the proffered
comparator be a plaintiff's "near twin, '245 and because, sometimes, a comparator simply
cannot be found.246 Under the most demanding view of comparator evidence and in cases
where there is no suitable comparator, the ADA-PDA comparisons I have argued for in this
Article may not, as a practical matter, be available.
Young, however, suggests that the strictest approach to comparator evidence is
incorrect. In Young, the Supreme Court signaled that courts should accept a broader range
of evidence in PDA cases: instead of focusing on narrow distinctions between employees,
the Court emphasized the importance of considering employer policies as a whole, as
well as the practical effects those policies have on workers. 247 As the Court noted, "it is
hardly anomalous ... that a plaintiff may rebut an employer's proffered justifications by
showing how a policy operates in practice. ' 248 And although the Court did not decide the
issue, the Young opinion strongly suggests that comparisons between pregnant employees
243 Zatz, supra note 229, at 69.
244 Some feminists have not yet taken the step of recognizing women's kinship with their disabled colleagues.
For example, as Matzzie points out, women's organizations did not participate at all in the EEOC's rulemaking
proceedings for the 1990 ADA. Matzzie, supra note 115, at 195. Perhaps if they had, pregnancy would receive
better protection today.
245 Williams et al., supra note 12, at 102.
246 See Widiss, supra note 12, at 1017.
247 Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,135 S. Ct. 1338, 1354-55 (2015).
248 Id. at 1355.
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and employees covered by the ADA-or who had lost their driving certifications, or who
became injured at work-would be appropriate. 249
Courts applying Young should embrace this more expansive approach to the types of
evidence that can support a pregnancy discrimination claim. For instance, it may not be
necessary for a comparator to be a plaintiff's "near twin" in every case, especially when
employer policies and other circumstantial evidence also support the necessary inference of
intentional discrimination. Moreover, as some scholars have suggested, it may be enough
for a plaintiff to point to a "hypothetical" comparator by showing that a non-pregnant
worker with a similar impairment would be entitled to reasonable accommodations under
the ADA or another provision. 2 ° And a less stringent view of comparator evidence would
also heed the lessons of both intersectionality theory and disruption theory by ensuring that
the law accounts for the multifaceted nature of pregnancy and by disrupting the processes
through which pregnant workers are marked as different from their colleagues. Finally, this
broader approach may prove to be essential: Congress enacted the PDA to promote equal
opportunity for pregnant women in the workforce; but as Young reminds us, the only route
to parity may be by comparison.
249 Id. at 1354-55.
250 See Widiss, supra note 12, at 1025; Williams et al., supra note 12, at 122-23 (discussing Widiss's
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